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 NOTE 
There Must Be a Better Way: The 
Unintended Consequences of Missouri’s 
Hancock Amendment 
Zweig v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 412 S.W.3d 223 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc). 
KIMBERLY HUBBARD* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Hancock Amendment to the Missouri Constitution1 became law in 
November 1980 after fifty-five percent of voters approved it.2  The amend-
ment is a type of provision known as a “tax and expenditure limitation.”3  The 
purpose of these provisions was “to restrict the growth of the state budget.”4  
Most people thought it meant that they would not have to pay higher taxes, 
and they were right to an extent.5  What voters and Mel Hancock, the 
amendment’s namesake, did not contemplate were the numerous ill-effects of 
this constitutional amendment.6 
 
* B.A. Political Science, University of Missouri, 2012; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2015.  I am grateful to Professor Michelle Arnopol Cecil for 
her suggestions and guidance during the writing and editing process of this Note.  I 
would also like to thank my family and significant other who love and support me in 
all of my endeavors. 
 1. MO. CONST. art. X, §§ 16-24. 
 2. Dale Singer, ‘Simple’ Hancock Amendment Spawned Complex State Financ-
es, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Apr. 8, 2011, 7:00 AM), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content
/16491/simple_hancock_amendment_spawned_complex_state_finances.  The Han-
cock Amendment states in pertinent part: 
Counties and other political subdivisions are hereby prohibited from levying 
any tax, license or fees, not authorized by law, charter or self-enforcing provi-
sions of the constitution when this section is adopted or from increasing the 
current levy of an existing tax, license or fees, above that current levy author-
ized by law or charter when this section is adopted without the approval of the 
required majority of the qualified voters of that county or other political sub-
division voting thereon. 
MO. CONST. art. X, § 22. 
 3. Dean Stansel, Missouri’s Hancock II Amendment: The Case for Real Reform, 
CATO INST. (Oct. 17, 1994), http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-020.html. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Singer, supra note 2. 
 6. See id. 
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One of the downsides of the amendment was brought to the forefront in 
the recent case of Zweig v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, decided by 
the Supreme Court of Missouri in November of 2013.7  The Metropolitan St. 
Louis Sewer District (“MSD”) was using some of its sewer revenues to sub-
sidize its stormwater operations, a practice that it described as “not sustaina-
ble.”8  It proposed a “stormwater user charge” to raise sufficient revenues to 
maintain its core functions.9  The Supreme Court of Missouri struck down the 
user charge, correctly reasoning that the Hancock Amendment prohibited 
MSD from imposing the charge because it was more characteristic of a tax.10  
Thus, under the Hancock Amendment, the stormwater user charge could not 
be levied without voter approval, which MSD did not get prior to instituting 
the charge.11 
A result of the Hancock Amendment, perhaps unforeseeable at the time 
of its inception, is that government functions, such as the stormwater system, 
the sewage system, and the education system, are at the mercy of voters when 
it comes to increasing their funding.  Voters do not often vote to raise taxes, 
as was evidenced by previous proposals to raise taxes on cigarettes.12  Voters 
defeated those proposals three different times, most recently in 2012.13  The 
ballot measures were unsuccessful even though the tax increase was only four 
cents,14 and despite the supporters’ coalition, Missourians for Health and 
Education, outspending the opponents by more than two-to-one in advertis-
ing.15 
Although properly decided, Zweig highlights several of the many con-
cerns raised by the Hancock Amendment, among which are lack of quality 
and quantity of services due to lack of funding, extensive and expensive liti-
gation brought under the amendment, and legislative workarounds that take 
decisions out of the hands of voters anyway.16  This Note first discusses the 
 
 7. 412 S.W.3d 223 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 8. Id. at 229. 
 9. Id. at 230. 
 10. Id. at 227, 244. 
 11. Id. at 244. 
 12. See Dale Singer, Power to the People? Hancock Amendment Worked Both 
Ways, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Apr. 10, 2011, 11:26 PM), https://www.stlbeacon.org/
#!/content/16477/power_to_the_people_hancock_amendment_worked_both_ways. 
 13. Tim Barker, Ballot Issues – Cigarette Tax Narrowly Fails, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:19 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-
politics/ballot-issues-cigarette-tax-narrowly-fails/article_299b37f2-284b-11e2-9111-
0019bb30f31a.html; see also Virginia Young, Cigarette Tax Increase on Missouri 




 14. See Singer, supra note 12. 
 15. Young, supra note 13. 
 16. See Singer, supra note 2. 
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Zweig case in detail and shows how the court’s holding stands strongly on 
reasonable grounds under the Missouri Constitution.  In Part III, this Note 
discusses the legal background surrounding the Zweig case, including the 
history of the Hancock Amendment and several cases that Zweig purports to 
overrule.  Finally, this Note ends with a discussion of the possibly unforeseen 
consequences that have resulted from the Hancock Amendment and proposes 
that these consequences merit giving the amendment a second look.  This 
Note does not suggest that the amendment be done away with entirely, as it 
has its merits; however, lawmakers and legal scholars in Missouri must begin 
an in-depth discussion of the amendment in order to decide the best course of 
action for the great state of Missouri and its future budget. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
MSD was created in 1954 when voters in the City of St. Louis and parts 
of St. Louis County ratified MSD’s charter pursuant to the Missouri Constitu-
tion.17  Shortly after it was created, MSD owned and controlled all the public 
sewer and stormwater facilities throughout the metropolitan sewer district.18  
The district expanded in 1977 and, beginning in 1989, MSD was responsible 
for regulating all the facilities in the district, including those in the newly 
annexed area, and planned to “assume ownership of and control over desig-
nated facilities as funds became available.”19 
MSD operates and maintains a stormwater drainage system and also 
maintains sewer operations, which are completely separate from the storm-
water drainage system.20  A landowner does not have to be physically con-
nected to MSD’s stormwater drainage system in order to “use” the drainage 
system by having stormwater flow through MSD’s system.21  This is quite 
different from the sewer operations that MSD conducts, as a physical connec-
tion between the land and the sewer system is required in order for that land-
owner to use MSD’s sewer system.22  Due to this lack of a physical connec-
tion between a landowner’s land and the stormwater drainage system, it is 
impossible for MSD to tell how much stormwater any single property dis-
charges into the system or where water flowing through the system came 
from originally.23 
Other stormwater services that MSD provides include some “stormwater 
oversight functions such as planning, permitting, and public education.”24  
 
 17. Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer District, 412 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Mo. 2013) 
(en banc). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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These oversight functions are not related to MSD’s operation of the storm-
water drainage system.25  According to MSD’s charter, MSD has the power 
to: 
(a) levy property taxes, provided the total levy for maintenance and 
operation does not exceed $0.10 per $100 assessed valuation; (b) levy 
special assessments for the construction, improvement, or extension of 
specific sewer or drainage facilities; and (c) establish a schedule of 
rates, rentals, and other charges, to be collected from all the real prop-
erty served by the sewer facilities of the District.26 
Before the implementation of the charge contested in this case, MSD 
funded its stormwater operations using several different taxes.27  MSD levied 
taxes on real property within the district of $0.02 per $100 assessed valuation, 
collected an additional $0.05 per $100 assessed valuation for property within 
the district’s original boundaries, and levied a surcharge for stormwater oper-
ations on each of its sewer customers of $0.24 per month.28  These taxes re-
sulted in receipts for MSD totaling $13.5 million for 2007.29      
Unfortunately, MSD spent $33 million on its stormwater operations in 
2007, which meant it had to use $19 million from its sewer revenues to subsi-
dize the stormwater operations.30  According to MSD, this subsidy was “not 
sustainable and, even if it was, a $33 million budget was not adequate to fund 
the range of stormwater drainage and oversight services MSD [believed were] 
required.”31 
These budget issues caused MSD to propose the stormwater usage 
charge at issue in this case.32  The proposed stormwater usage charge was 
meant to replace the existing property taxes and was based on the square 
footage of impervious area on each owner’s property.33  MSD determined 
that it would need to charge landowners $2.29 per 100 square feet of imper-
vious area per year in order to raise adequate revenue to maintain the availa-
bility of its stormwater services.34  Ultimately, the $2.29 annual rate was di-
vided by twelve so that it could be charged monthly.35  MSD estimated that 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 230-31. 
 33. Id. at 230.  Some examples of impervious areas are roofs, patios, parking 
lots, streets, and sidewalks.  Id. 
 34. Id. at 231. 
 35. Id. 
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once the proposed stormwater usage charge was fully implemented it would 
generate annual revenues of $57 million.36 
In December 2007, following public hearings, other proceedings, and a 
recommendation by MSD’s rate commission that MSD implement the pro-
posed stormwater usage charge, MSD adopted ordinances that would elimi-
nate any existing stormwater taxes and replace them with a stormwater user 
charge in March 2008.37  MSD planned to implement the new scheme gradu-
ally, starting with a charge of $1.44 for each 100 square feet of impervious 
area annually in 2008, and increasing the fee annually so that landowners 
would pay the full rate of $2.29 per 100 square feet of impervious land by 
2014.38 
MSD’s implementation of the charge was successful until William 
Zweig and several other ratepayers (“Ratepayers”) sued MSD in a class ac-
tion.39  The Ratepayers asserted that MSD’s implementation of its stormwater 
user charge without prior voter approval violated Article X, Section 22(a) of 
the Missouri Constitution and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary 
remedies.40 
The trial court agreed with the Ratepayers and enjoined MSD from fu-
ture collection of the charge.41  The court further ordered that MSD pay the 
Ratepayers’ attorneys’ fees and other expenses.42  However, the Ratepayers 
were unsuccessful in obtaining monetary remedies for the unconstitutional 
stormwater user charges that they had already paid in 2008 and 2009.43  The 
trial court did not order MSD to pay damages or to refund any charges al-
ready collected.44 
The case that is the subject of this Note is the result of MSD’s appeal of 
the trial court’s decision regarding the Ratepayers’ constitutional claim and 
the award of the Ratepayers’ attorneys’ fees and expenses.45  Another issue in 
this case comes from the Ratepayers’ cross-appeal of the trial court’s decision 
not to award the Ratepayers monetary judgment for any amounts already 
 
 36. Id. at 230. 
 37. Id. at 230-31. 
 38. Id. at 231. 
 39. Id. at 226. 
 40. Id.  That Section of the Missouri Constitution “prohibits political subdivi-
sions ‘from levying any [new or increased] tax, license or fees’ without prior voter 
approval . . . [but] does not prohibit a political subdivision from charging an individu-
al user a fee in exchange for rendering a service to that user.”  Id. (first alteration in 
original) (emphasis added) (quoting MO. CONST. art. X, §22(a)).  Sections 16 to 24 of 
the Missouri Constitution are collectively referred to as the Hancock Amendment.  Id. 
at 231. 
 41. Id. at 226. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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collected by MSD.46  The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer of the 
case in October 2012.47 
MSD conceded that it had “no way to measure each landowner’s dis-
charge into its drainage system during a storm,” and thus the stormwater user 
charge was “not charged in exchange for an individual land owner’s ‘use’ of 
MSD’s drainage system . . . or that landowner’s ‘use’ of MSD’s oversight 
functions.”48  MSD instead argued that its stormwater user charge was consti-
tutional because it was a “user fee paid for MSD’s service of ensuring the 
‘continuous and ongoing’ availability of its stormwater drainage system (and 
oversight functions), rain or shine.”49  MSD supported its argument that the 
stormwater user charge should be classified as a user fee by contending that 
the fee was “based on each landowner’s individual contribution to the overall 
need for MSD’s stormwater services.”50 
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court’s decision that 
the stormwater user charge violated Section 22(a) of the Hancock Amend-
ment.51  After analyzing the stormwater user charge using the five criteria 
from Keller v. Marion County Ambulance District52 and other relevant fac-
tors,53 the court determined that the charge was not a user fee, but rather that 
MSD was actually levying a tax.54  The court pointed out that, under the Han-
cock Amendment, voters must approve any new or increased taxes.55  There-
fore, the court found that MSD’s collection of the stormwater user charge 
violated the Hancock Amendment because it was a tax and the voters had not 
approved it.56 
The Court also agreed with the trial court that the Ratepayers were not 
entitled to a refund of the amounts they had already paid to MSD as storm-
water user charges.57  The Ratepayers could not get a refund because accord-
ing to the court, “nothing in [S]ection 22(a) or elsewhere in the Hancock 
Amendment expressly authorize[d] Missouri courts to order such a reme-
dy.”58  Ratepayers relied on language in three separate cases59 to argue that 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 227. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 244. 
 52. 820 S.W.2d 301, 304 n.10 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
 53. The court also considered MSD’s lien for nonpayment, the other remedies 
MSD had if the fee was not paid, and the voters’ remedies in determining whether 
voter approval was required under the Hancock Amendment before MSD could col-
lect its stormwater user charge.  Zweig, 412 S.W.3d at 242-44. 
 54. Id. at 244. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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they were entitled to refunds of the stormwater user charges that they had 
already paid.60  The court, however, did not find anything in those cases indi-
cating that Article X, Section 23 authorized courts to award money damages 
as a remedy when a political subdivision levied a tax without the required 
prior voter approval.61  Further, the court clarified its decision by stating that 
it was overruling those decisions to the extent they suggested that Section 23 
authorized such a remedy to taxpayers.62 
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court’s award requir-
ing MSD to pay $4.3 million in attorneys’ fees and $470,000 in expenses to 
the Ratepayers because it found that the trial court had not abused its discre-
tion in making the awards.63  After affirming the trial court’s judgment, the 
Court remanded the case so the trial court could consider the singular issue of 
whether the Ratepayers were entitled to appellate fees and costs.64   
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This section first discusses the Hancock Amendment and its history.  It 
also explains the Keller decision and the criteria from that case, which the 
court used in Zweig to determine that the stormwater user charge was a tax 
and not a user fee.  Finally, this section explains the Beatty III, Ring, and City 
of Hazelwood cases, which the Ratepayers in Zweig used to argue that they 
were entitled to a refund of the improperly levied stormwater user charges. 
A.  The Hancock Amendment 
In 1980, Missouri voters approved Article X, Sections 16 to 24 of the 
Missouri Constitution, which are collectively referred to as the Hancock 
Amendment.65  Missouri is one of several states to have passed a tax-limiting 
law like the Hancock Amendment.66 
 
 59. Those three cases were City of Hazelwood v. Peterson, 48 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 
2001) (en banc), Ring v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 969 S.W.2d 716 (Mo. 
1998) (en banc), and Beatty v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (Beatty III), 914 
S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1995) (en banc).  Zweig, 412 S.W.3d at 246. 
 60. Id. at 246-49. 
 61. Id. at 248. 
 62. Id. at 248 n.17. 
 63. Id. at 249. 
 64. Id. at 252. 
 65. Id. at 231. 
 66. Jonathan G. Bremer, Note, Pulling the Taxpayer’s Sword from the Stone: 
The Appropriation Requirement of Missouri’s Hancock Amendment, 77 MO. L. REV. 
481, 484 (2012).  The state constitutions of Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, and South Carolina all include measures limiting state 
revenues or expenditures based on several different factors.  Richard Briffault, Fore-
word: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 
34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 931 (2003).  California and Michigan also require voter ap-
7
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In the late 1970s, the American economy was experiencing a condition 
called “stagflation,” which occurs when “the economy [is] stagnant while 
inflation soar[s].”67  This resulted in property tax revolts, which began in 
California and spread across the United States.68  Mel Hancock, the leader of 
a group called the Taxpayers Survival Association, led the revolt in Mis-
souri.69  Mr. Hancock “wrote every Missouri state and federal legislator about 
the need for tax limitation,” but when the legislature failed to act, he started 
an initiative petition and authored his own constitutional amendment that 
“tie[d] state revenue increases to an equivalent rise in personal income.”70 
The Hancock Amendment had the support of then-governor Joe Teas-
dale and the Missouri Farm Bureau, but otherwise had few institutional sup-
porters.71  Several early legal challenges almost succeeded in knocking the 
proposal from the ballot, and opponents of the measure contended that it was 
poorly written, which would arguably cause endless litigation regarding its 
provisions.72  Critics argued that the Hancock Amendment “would not permit 
the legislature the flexibility needed to deal with an economic crisis.” 73  They 
also claimed that “legal restraints on fiscal spending were already in place in 
that Missouri’s constitution required the state to keep a balanced budget.”74 
The main contention stressed by opponents of the Hancock Amendment 
was that only six states had lower per capita taxes than Missouri at the time 
the amendment was being pushed through the legislature, making the 
amendment seem unnecessary.75  The Kansas City Star editorialized that the 
Hancock Amendment was the equivalent of “locking representative govern-
ment in a straitjacket.”76 
Despite what seemed obvious to critics – that a number-seven ranking in 
per capita taxes meant that no problem needed to be remedied – Missouri 
voters passed the Hancock Amendment with fifty-five percent of the vote.77  
Since its passage, loopholes in the Hancock Amendment have allowed law-
makers to “devise ways around its restrictions.”78  Many still believe, howev-
 
proval for new or increased local taxes, while other states including Montana, Wash-
ington, Arizona, Oregon, and Florida have proposed adding voter requirements.  Id. at 
932 & n.138. 
 67. Kenneth H. Winn, It All Adds Up: Reform and the Erosion of Representative 
Government in Missouri, 1900-2000, MO. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.mo.gov/
archives/pubs/article/article.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.; Singer, supra note 2. 
 70. Winn, supra note 67. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  These critics are likely now happily retired and thinking, “I told you so.” 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Singer, supra note 2. 
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er, that the Hancock Amendment has “unnecessarily harmed the effectiveness 
of state government.”79 
There are two sections of the Hancock Amendment that are applicable 
in Zweig.  Section 16 states, “Property taxes and other local taxes . . . may not 
be increased above the limitations specified herein without direct voter ap-
proval as provided by this constitution.”80  Additionally, Section 22(a) states 
that: 
[c]ounties and other political subdivisions are hereby prohibited from 
levying any tax, license or fees . . . or from increasing the current levy 
of an existing tax, license or fees . . . without the approval of the re-
quired majority of the qualified voters of that county or other political 
subdivision voting thereon.81 
As the court stated in Zweig, “Article X, [S]ection 22(a) of the Missouri 
Constitution prohibits political subdivisions from levying any [new or in-
creased] tax, license or fees without prior voter approval.”82  The court further 
stated, citing the Keller opinion, that Section 22(a) “does not prohibit a politi-
cal subdivision from charging an individual user a fee in exchange for render-
ing a service to that user, so long as this charge is not simply a tax by another 
name.”83 
B.  The Keller Case and Criteria 
In Zweig, the court acknowledged the influence of the Keller case in de-
termining whether a source of revenue is a tax that would require voter ap-
proval under the Hancock Amendment or a “charge[] . . . for actual services 
rendered” that would not require such approval.84  The court in Zweig used 
the five criteria from Keller to help decide that the stormwater user charge 
was an unconstitutional tax because it was levied without voter approval.85 
In Keller, the Marion County Ambulance District (“District”) estab-
lished a new schedule of charges for its services in February 1989, most of 
which were increases over previous charges.86  A group of taxpayers who 
lived in the District sued, “claiming that these increases violated Article X, 
 
 79. Winn, supra note 67. 
 80. MO. CONST. art. X, § 16. 
 81. MO. CONST. art. X, § 22(a). 
 82. Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83. Id. (citing Keller v. Marion Cnty. Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301, 305 
(Mo. 1991) (en banc)). 
 84. Id. at 232-33 (quoting Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 302, 304 n.7, 305) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 85. Id. at 232-42. 
 86. Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 302. 
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[Section] 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution” because none of the charges had 
been submitted for voter approval.87   
The Keller court first stated that “there are two types of local revenue 
increases: those subject to the Hancock Amendment and those not subject to 
the Hancock Amendment.”88  The court determined that among those revenue 
increases not subject to the Hancock Amendment were “fee increases which 
are general and special revenues but not a tax,”89 or, in other words, user fees 
that constitute “specific charges for services actually provided by a govern-
ment entity.”90  The Keller court’s opinion focused on determining that such 
user fees did not constitute revenue subject to the Hancock Amendment, but 
in dicta laid out the five criteria that it deemed critical in determining “wheth-
er a revenue increase by a local government is an increase in a tax, license or 
fees [sic] that requires voter approval under the Hancock Amendment.”91 
The first criterion is to determine when the fee is paid.92  According to 
the court, “[f]ees subject to the Hancock Amendment are likely due to be paid 
on a periodic basis while fees not subject to the Hancock Amendment are 
likely due to be paid only on or after provision of a good or service to the 
individual paying the fee.”93 
The court stated that its second criterion is to determine who pays the 
fee.94  Fees subject to the Hancock Amendment are those that are billed to 
every resident or almost every resident of the political subdivision.95  On the 
other hand, the court stated that fees not subject to the Hancock Amendment 
are “likely to be charged only to those who actually use the good or service 
for which the fee is charged.”96 
The court then articulated that the third criterion is ascertaining if the 
amount of the fee to be paid is “affected by the level of goods or services 
provided to the fee payer.”97  A conclusion that a fee is not dependent on the 
level of goods or services provided to the fee payer weighs in favor of the fee 
being subject to the Hancock Amendment, while a conclusion that the fee is 
dependent on the goods or services provided to the fee payer weighs in favor 
of the fee not being subject to the Hancock Amendment.98 
The fourth criterion is to determine what is being provided.99  According 
to the court, “[i]f the government is providing a good or a service, or permis-
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 303. 
 89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90. Id. at 305. 
 91. Id. at 304 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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sion to use government property, the fee is less likely to be subject to the 
Hancock Amendment.”100  On the contrary, “[i]f there is no good or service 
being provided, or someone unconnected with the government is providing 
the good or service, then any charge required by and paid to a local govern-
ment is probably subject to the Hancock Amendment.”101 
Finally, the court stated that the fifth criterion is to determine if the ac-
tivity is one that has been historically and exclusively provided by the gov-
ernment.102  If it is a fee of that nature, then it is probably subject to the Han-
cock Amendment, whereas “[i]f the government has not historically and ex-
clusively provided the good, service, permission or activity, then any charge 
is probably not subject to the Hancock Amendment.”103 
The court stated that, “[b]ased on [the above-mentioned] criteria, prop-
erty taxes, sales taxes, franchise taxes, and income taxes, among others, are 
subject to the Hancock Amendment.”104  Further, the court noted that no sin-
gle criterion was controlling to determine “whether the charge is closer to 
being a ‘true’ user fee or a tax denominated as a fee,” and that this determina-
tion should be made by using all the criteria together.105 
Many courts have used the Keller criteria to determine if a fee is subject 
to the Hancock Amendment, but the court in Zweig reiterated what the Su-
preme Court of Missouri had already emphasized about the criteria several 
times: “the Keller criteria are to be used only as reliable indicators, not con-
stitutional divining rods.”106  Therefore, the Keller criteria remain in use, but 
merely serve as an “aid” to courts attempting to apply the court’s “long-
standing, traditional test for distinguishing fees and taxes: [f]ees or charges 
prescribed by law to be paid by certain individuals to public officers for ser-
vices rendered in connection with a specific purpose ordinarily are not tax-
es.”107 
C.  Cases Effectively Overruled by the Refund Decision of Zweig 
The Ratepayers in Zweig argued that the court’s ruling regarding a re-
fund conflicted with the court’s earlier holdings in Beatty v. Metropolitan St. 
Louis Sewer District (“Beatty III”),108 Ring v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer 
District,109 and City of Hazelwood v. Peterson.110 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 233 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc). 
 107. Id. at 234 (quoting Keller, 820 S.W.2d at 303-04) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 108. 914 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1995) (en banc). 
 109. 969 S.W.2d 716 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
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As in Zweig, MSD was the defendant in Beatty III, and residents of the 
district brought an action against it because of an ordinance it enacted that 
increased wastewater charges for one year.111  Similar to the holding in the 
Zweig case, the court had held in the earlier Beatty II112 decision that the 
charges were subject to Article X, Section 22(a) of the Hancock Amendment 
and, therefore, “could not be increased without prior voter approval.”113  On 
remand, the trial court held that MSD must refund the increased charges to all 
affected customers by crediting their future bills.114  The court’s decision in 
Beatty III was rendered in order to determine if the trial court’s ruling that 
MSD needed to refund the amounts was proper.115  The court decided that the 
plaintiffs116 were entitled to a refund in the form of a “set-off” applied to later 
bills from MSD.117  This decision, however, was based on an ordinance 
passed by MSD and not on the language of the Hancock Amendment.118  The 
court expressly refused to decide whether plaintiffs were entitled to a direct 
refund under the Hancock Amendment of the taxes improperly collected that 
were later found to be unconstitutional.119 
The plaintiffs in Ring v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District brought a 
class action seeking the same remedy from MSD as that in Beatty III.120  The 
ruling in Beatty III was clear that only the named plaintiffs in that case could 
recover the overpayments through a credit on their subsequent bills.121  The 
issue in Ring was whether a class action suit against MSD was the correct 
vehicle for all taxpayers within the district to recover their overpayments, 
and, if it was, whether the members of the class had a cause of action.122  The 
court in Ring determined that a taxpayer’s action to enforce Section 22(a) 
arises in one of two ways.123  First, a taxpayer can attempt to obtain an in-
junction to enjoin the collection of a tax until a court determines the constitu-
 
 110. 48 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). 
 111. Beatty III, 914 S.W.2d at 793. 
 112. Beatty v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. (Beatty II), 867 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Mo. 
1993) (en banc). 
 113. Beatty III, 914 S.W.2d at 794 (citing Beatty II, 867 S.W.2d at 221). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 792. 
 116. It is important to note that in Beatty III the set-off remedy was given only to 
the named plaintiffs because the plaintiffs had not sought to “pursue [the] litigation on 
behalf of any defined class of individuals other than themselves.”  Id. at 797.  The 
court declined to decide if “the remainder of MSD customers [were] entitled to any 
setoffs in accordance with [the] MSD [ordinance].”  Id. 
 117. Id. at 796. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Ring v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 969 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Mo. 1998) (en 
banc). 
 121. Id. (citation omitted). 
 122. Id. at 717-18. 
 123. Id. at 718. 
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tionality of the tax.124  The second scenario for enforcing Section 22(a) arises 
only if the first scenario is not available,125 making Section 22(a) enforceable 
“only by a timely action to seek a refund of the amount of the unconstitution-
ally-imposed increase.”126 
Accordingly, the court determined that the case in Ring fell into the sec-
ond category and held that Article X, Section 23 “operates as a waiver of 
sovereign immunity and permits taxpayers to seek a refund of increased taxes 
previously collected by a political subdivision in violation of [A]rticle X, 
[S]ection 22(a).”127  The Zweig court disagreed with the Ring court’s decision 
that the case fell into the second category, distinguishing and expressly over-
ruling Ring in its decision.128 
The third case the Ratepayers cited in Zweig for the authority that they 
were entitled to obtain refunds from MSD was City of Hazelwood v. Peter-
son.129  In City of Hazelwood, several citizens and the City of Hazelwood 
collectively brought “two lawsuits to recover excess tax payments made to 
the Florissant Valley Fire Protection District.”130  The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s decision that “the 
District collected a certain tax increase in violation of [A]rticle X, [S]ection 
22(a) of the Missouri Constitution,” and the court’s order that “the District . . 
. return all overpayments made by the individual taxpayers and by the city of 
Hazelwood.”131 
The court determined that the plaintiffs in City of Hazelwood were enti-
tled to a refund, based not on the language of the Hancock Amendment, but 
on the language of an election contest statute that enabled a district to collect 
a new tax after official results of an election were tabulated.132  Although the 
tax itself was unconstitutional under the Hancock Amendment, the court held 
that the refund was still authorized by the election contest statute.133  As the 
Zweig court pointed out, the Ratepayers’ reliance on the City of Hazelwood 
case in Zweig was misplaced because the case dealt with the “proper con-
struction and application of Missouri’s election contest statutes, not the Han-
cock Amendment.”134 
The Hancock Amendment was the constitutional provision at issue in 
Zweig, and the Supreme Court of Missouri, like many courts before it, used 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 247-48 (Mo. 2013) 
(en banc). 
 126. Ring, 969 S.W.2d at 718-19 (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. at 719. 
 128. Zweig, 412 S.W.3d at 246-48, 248 n.17. 
 129. 48 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). 
 130. Id. at 37. 
 131. Id. at 37-38. 
 132. Id. at 40 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 115.595.2 (Supp. 2012)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 248 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc). 
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the Keller criteria to help determine if the stormwater user charge was subject 
to the Hancock Amendment.  Beatty III, Ring, and City of Hazelwood set the 
stage for the Ratepayers’ valiant, but misplaced, argument that the court’s 
ruling regarding Ratepayers’ lack of entitlement to a refund in Zweig was 
contrary to prior precedent of the Supreme Court of Missouri. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In Zweig v. Metropolitan St. Louis School District, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri held that MSD’s stormwater user charge was unconstitutional 
because it was a tax that needed voter approval in order to be levied, but had 
not received such approval.135  The court also held that the Ratepayers were 
not entitled to refunds of “stormwater user charges” they had already paid 
because nothing in the Hancock Amendment authorized the court to order 
such refunds.136 
Judge Paul Wilson’s analysis of the case began by explaining the Han-
cock Amendment and the Keller decision.137  The court explained that Kel-
ler’s holding determined the difference between revenues subject to the Han-
cock Amendment and revenues not subject to it.138 
Despite the court’s opinion that “[t]he holding and reasoning of Keller 
ha[d] been overshadowed to some degree by the list of five criteria of-
fered,”139 the court next launched into describing the five criteria and evaluat-
ing the stormwater user charge under each criterion to determine if it was a 
revenue subject to the Hancock Amendment.140  The court did not evaluate 
the criteria in numerical order as they were set out in Keller because it rea-
soned that “judicial frustration with the Keller criteria may lie more with the 
order of those criteria than with their substance.”141 
Starting with the fourth criterion, which focused on whether the service 
was provided in exchange for a fee, the court determined that “MSD did not 
impose the charge in exchange for an individual’s actual use of . . . ser-
vices.”142  The decision on this criterion weighed in favor of the stormwater 
user charge being subject to the Hancock Amendment because it looked more 
like a tax than a user fee.143  The court next evaluated the second Keller crite-
rion, determining who pays the fee.144  The court’s determination that owners, 
 
 135. Id. at 244. 
 136. Id. at 248-49. 
 137. Id. at 231-33. 
 138. Id. at 232. 
 139. Id. at 233. 
 140. Id. at 233-42. 
 141. Id. at 234. 
 142. Id. at 236. 
 143. Id. at 234-36. 
 144. Id. at 236. 
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and not users, were the ones paying the fee weighed strongly in favor of the 
fee being subject to the Hancock Amendment.145 
Continuing with its analysis of the Keller criteria, the court next deter-
mined that the first criterion – when the fee is paid – weighed in favor of the 
fee being categorized as a tax subject to the Hancock Amendment rather than 
a user fee not subject to the Hancock Amendment.146  The court stated that 
this first criterion weighed heavily in favor of deeming the stormwater user 
charge a tax because it was impossible to determine to whom MSD’s services 
were being supplied: there were no individual users of the services – MSD’s 
services were rendered to the entire district.147 
Next, the court evaluated criterion three, which consisted of determining 
how much was paid.148  If the fee is “dependent on the level of the goods or 
services provided to the fee payer,” then the fee is more likely a user fee than 
a tax subject to the Hancock Amendment.149  The court concluded this crite-
rion also weighed in favor of categorizing the charge as a tax and not a user 
fee.150 
The fifth and final Keller criterion – whether the service is historically 
and exclusively a service rendered by the government – came out much the 
same way for the court as did the first four criteria.151  The court stated, 
“[p]roviding for [stormwater] drainage and sewerage is a governmental func-
tion and an exercise of the police power of the state.”152  As such, the court 
found that “the fifth Keller criterion suggest[ed] that MSD was levying a tax 
– not merely setting a price – when it imposed the stormwater user charge 
without prior voter approval.”153 
The court also considered some additional characteristics of the storm-
water user charge in determining whether “the political subdivision ha[d] 
levied a new or increased tax without prior approval of its voters.”154  First, 
the court articulated, “[t]he fact that MSD has given itself a lien as a remedy 
for nonpayment of the stormwater user charge suggests that MSD was levy-
ing a tax when it implemented that charge.”155  According to the court, this 
was because “[a]bsent an agreement by the debtor, only the government (and 
 
 145. Id. at 237-38. 
 146. Id. at 238-39. 
 147. Id. at 239. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 239-41. 
 151. Id. at 241-42. 
 152. Id. at 241 (second alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Dalton v. Met-
ro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 275 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Mo. 1955) (en banc)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 153. Id. at 242. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 243. 
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those creditors it elects to favor with this remedy by statute) enjoy the bene-
fits of a lien arising solely from the nonpayment of an obligation.”156 
Another factor the court found to weigh in favor of the stormwater user 
charge being a tax and not a user fee was “that MSD can use nonpayment of 
[the] charge as a justification to withhold services having nothing to do with 
stormwater services.”157  “Such remedies,” the court reasoned, “are more 
characteristic of the way in which governments collect unpaid taxes than the 
manner in which private parties collect unpaid prices or user fees.”158  Alt-
hough the court “sympathize[d] with MSD’s predicament,” because of the 
Keller criteria and the other relevant factors the court considered, it ultimately 
concluded that “MSD levied the stormwater user charge without prior voter 
approval in violation of [S]ection 22(a).”159 
The court went on to consider whether to refund the “approximately $90 
million in stormwater user charges collected between April 2008 and the date 
of the trial court’s judgment on the merits.”160  First, the court articulated the 
principle that “[a]bsent special circumstances . . . it is well-established that a 
taxpayer is not entitled to a refund of illegal taxes unless the refund is author-
ized by law.”161  The court made it clear that those special circumstances 
were absent in this case.162  Therefore, the refunds would need to be author-
ized somehow by law.163 
The court first looked at the plain language of the Hancock Amend-
ment’s remedies provision in Section 23 and determined that, “[b]y its plain 
language, the only monetary relief courts are authorized to give under 
[S]ection 23 is an award of expenses and attorneys’ fees.”164  Further, the 
court stated that the principal relief authorized under that Section “is declara-
tory and not remedial.”165 
Next, the court determined that the sections of the Hancock Amendment 
at issue in the present case – Sections 16 and 22(a) – did not authorize the use 
of refunds as a remedy.166  This was true, the court reasoned, because “[t]he 
framers of the Hancock Amendment knew how to authorize this remedy 
when appropriate and chose to restrict its use only to violations of [S]ection 
18(a) and not [S]ection 22(a).”167  The court also indicated a policy reason to 
explain why the Hancock Amendment should limit the use of refunds, essen-
 
 156. Id. at 242. 
 157. Id. at 243. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 244. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (citing Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. State, 896 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Mo. 1995) 
(en banc)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 245. 
 167. Id. 
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tially suggesting that most government entities could not operate monetarily 
if they were forced to refund such large amounts of money.168 
The court held that “the Hancock Amendment does not expressly au-
thorize Missouri courts to order a political subdivision to refund taxes col-
lected in violation of [S]ection 22(a)” and stated that ordering such refunds 
without express authority would “infer or imply that a waiver of sovereign 
immunity extends to remedies that are not essential to enforce the right in 
question.”169 
The Ratepayers’ argument that this holding conflicted with the court’s 
earlier holdings in Beatty III, Ring, and City of Hazelwood was unsuccess-
ful.170  The court plainly stated that Beatty III expressly declined to reach the 
issue of whether the Hancock Amendment authorizes refunds when a politi-
cal subdivision violates Section 22(a).171  The court was also able to distin-
guish its holding from its earlier holdings in Ring and City of Hazelwood, 
despite the Ratepayers utilizing some language from the decisions that might 
have indicated otherwise.172  The court stated that “[r]ead carefully, nothing 
in Beatty III, Ring, or [City of] Hazelwood holds that [A]rticle X, [S]ection 
23, by itself, authorizes courts to award money damages in the form of re-
funds . . . as a remedy” in this situation.173  In dicta, the court then determined 
that the Beatty III, Ring, and City of Hazelwood cases were all being over-
ruled by the decision in Zweig “to the extent they suggest[ed] that [S]ection 
23, by itself, authorizes courts to award refunds or other money damages.”174  
The court was clearly setting out its own principle that Section 23 of the Han-
cock Amendment, by itself, did not authorize courts to award refunds or other 
money damages “as a remedy for a political subdivision levying a tax without 
the prior voter approval required by [S]ection 22(a).”175 
The court concluded its opinion with the hope that, in light of its deci-
sion, future Hancock Amendment cases could be “resolved quickly, accurate-
ly, and without undue expense or delay.”176  After affirming the trial court’s 
judgment in all respects, the case was remanded in order for the trial court to 
render a decision on Ratepayers’ motion for appellate fees and costs.177 
Through its decision in Zweig, the court made clear that a fee collected 
by a government entity is a tax for purposes of the Hancock Amendment 
when several factors are present: (1) a government charge is not collected in 
exchange for a particular service; (2) the charge is paid by owners and not 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 245-46 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fort Zumwalt, 896 S.W.2d at 923) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170. Id. at 246. 
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 172. Id. at 246-48. 
 173. Id. at 248. 
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users; (3) the charge is paid regularly and not after use; (4) the amount of the 
charge is a fixed rate and not based on use; (5) the service is historically and 
exclusively governmental; (6) the government entity assessing the charge can 
obtain a lien on property if the charge is not paid; and (7) the remedy for non-
payment does not coincide with the service for which the fee is being collect-
ed.178  If several of those factors are present, a court will likely find that the 
fee is a tax and violates the Hancock Amendment if it is being charged with-
out prior voter approval.179  The court’s decision also set out the principle that 
when a tax is unconstitutionally levied under the Hancock Amendment with-
out prior voter approval, a court cannot order a refund of those taxes because 
the Hancock Amendment does not grant courts that authority.180 
V.  COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of Missouri in Zweig determined that MSD’s 
stormwater user charge was an unconstitutional tax because it was levied 
without voter approval.  It is unclear, however, what will happen next.  This 
question, and many others left in the aftermath of the Hancock Amendment, 
shows the need for lawmakers and legal scholars in Missouri to consider the 
ramifications of this nearly thirty-five-year-old constitutional amendment and 
to determine if it is time for a change. 
A.  Critiques of the Hancock Amendment 
At its passage, the Hancock Amendment barely gathered a majority of 
support from voters.181  Officials and institutions within the state were unsup-
portive of the Hancock Amendment as well.182  Even the Hancock Amend-
ment’s namesake, Mr. Mel Hancock, was unhappy with the way that courts 
and legislators treated the Amendment over the years.183  While the Hancock 
Amendment has been successful in limiting Missouri’s tax revenue, as Mr. 
Hancock originally intended, the implications of the Amendment and that 
limitation are abundantly negative. 
First, litigation surrounding the Hancock Amendment has been plentiful 
and expensive.184  Zweig is just one example.  Over three years passed be-
tween the trial court’s determination that the fee was unconstitutional and 
MSD’s exhaustion of its final judicial remedy with the review by the Su-
preme Court of Missouri.185  MSD was also ordered to pay $4.3 million in 
 
 178. Id. at 234-44. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. at 244-45. 
 181. Singer, supra note 2. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Zweig, 412 S.W.3d at 231. 
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attorneys’ fees and $470,000 in expenses, as well as the attorneys’ fees calcu-
lated on remand for the appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri.186  This 
amount is unfortunate, considering MSD was already operating its storm-
water system using its sewer system revenues.  Ironically, the taxpayers ulti-
mately footed the bill for the litigation. 
Second, in spite of court rulings such as the one in Zweig, lawmakers 
have managed to find ways around the Hancock Amendment’s limitations.187  
There has been an increased use of tax credits by lawmakers – decisions that 
are now made behind closed doors.188  Also, the Hancock Amendment has 
caused an increase in the number of initiative petitions, which can “give dis-
proportionate influence to rich individuals who are willing to spend their 
money to advance their political philosophy.”189 
Finally, the Hancock Amendment has resulted in exactly what its name-
sake wanted: a limitation on Missouri’s revenue.190  This limitation, however, 
comes with the consequences of inadequate services and a decrease in state 
jobs: “Missouri remains in a budget hole, even after hundreds of millions of 
dollars in budget cuts since the economy went off the cliff in 2008.  Because 
the state must have a balanced budget every year, reductions in state workers 
and services were inevitable.”191  With the requirement that voters must ap-
prove any taxes, only some government programs can be funded.  According 
to David Valentine, former Director of the Division of Research at the Mis-
souri Senate, Missourians will usually vote for things like public education, 
law enforcement, and economic development, while other programs, like the 
state prison system and public assistance, will not get enough votes to raise 
the money that they need to operate.192 
Voters may be more likely to vote to approve higher taxes for public 
services like education, but data regarding Missouri’s actual spending on 
services is indicative that a change must be made: In 2006, Missouri was 37th 
and 45th in the nation on per capita state and local investment in elementary 
and secondary education and higher education, respectively.193  Mr. Valen-
tine’s statement regarding the prison system not getting enough votes to raise 
 
 186. Id. at 249, 252. 
 187. Singer, supra note 12. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Singer, supra note 2. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Dale Singer, Low Taxes? Low Services? Hancock Contributed to Legacy, ST. 
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 193. AMY BLOUIN & TOM KRUCKEMEYER, MO. BUDGET PROJECT, COMPARING 
MISSOURI’S TAX AND SPENDING WITH THE NATION: WHERE MISSOURI RANKS IN 2009 
3 (2009), available at http://www.mobudget.org/files/Where%20Missouri%20Ranks
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the money it needs to operate is evidenced by the fact that Missouri was 
ranked 44th for state and local spending per capita on corrections in 2006.194 
B.  Critiques of the Zweig Case 
The Zweig opinion raises concerns regarding the Hancock Amend-
ment’s lack of redress for taxpayers who have paid unconstitutional taxes in 
the past.195  If the government levies an unconstitutional tax, taxpayers are 
left with only one option: to enter into extensive litigation to keep from hav-
ing to pay the tax in the future.  Under a cynical view of government, this 
situation lends itself to a possible scenario where the government entity levies 
a tax in bad faith without voter approval to reap its rewards until a taxpayer 
decides it is worth the time and cost to litigate the unconstitutional tax. 
One solution that could deter this outcome is a law mimicking the Zweig 
court’s decision that would require the government to pay attorney’s fees 
when a tax is deemed unconstitutional under the Hancock Amendment.196  
There are two problems with this solution, however.  The government entity 
required to pay the attorneys’ fees would go even deeper into debt due to the 
lack of revenue coupled with the payment of expensive attorneys’ fees for 
litigation.  Additionally, this burden would be shouldered by the taxpayers as 
well because taxpayers pay for governmental entities’ expenses. 
There is no doubt that the Hancock Amendment is fulfilling its original 
purpose: it limits Missouri’s revenues, a concept Mel Hancock believed was 
“easy to understand.”197  Limiting Missouri’s revenues comes with an array 
of less than desirable consequences, however.  Missouri lawmakers circum-
vent the Hancock Amendment with tax credits and initiatives.198  While these 
credits raise the needed money for some government programs and services, 
they also remove tax decisions from Missouri voters’ purview, which is 
where the Hancock Amendment originally placed them.199  Expensive litiga-
tion ensues, costing the taxpayers even more time and money.200  Possibly the 
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 195. Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 248-49 (Mo. 2013) 
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most important negative consequence to consider is that Missouri’s govern-
ment services are in some cases abysmal or non-existent.201  Surely Mr. Han-
cock did not intend these effects that stem from limiting Missouri’s revenues 
when he proposed the Hancock Amendment almost thirty-five years ago. 
C.  Proposed Changes 
Lawmakers and legal scholars should carefully and seriously reconsider 
the Hancock Amendment.  A discussion regarding possible changes to or a 
repeal of the Hancock Amendment could improve Missouri tax policy for the 
better without increasing taxes by a burdensome amount.  Regardless of what 
provision replaces it, Section 16 of the Hancock Amendment, which requires 
voter approval for new or increased taxes, cannot remain unchanged.  There 
are several options that could provide voters and lawmakers with an accepta-
ble solution.  The first two options proposed in this Note would be adopted in 
place of Section 16, while the third proposes changes to Section 16. 
The first option is to enact a constitutional amendment wherein only in-
creases in a specific tax would require voter approval.  This change would 
require voter approval for only changes to the following types of taxes: in-
come tax, sales tax, or property tax.  With this measure, the state’s revenue 
and spending is still limited in some instances, hopefully to the satisfaction of 
voters, but the state is not completely out of options if voters refuse to pass a 
proposed new or increased tax. 
The second option is to adopt something similar to the measures that 
appear in the constitutions of Arizona, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, and 
Florida.202  Such a measure could require the Missouri legislature to impose 
revenue or expenditure limitations based on a variety of factors, including 
“growth in state population, the cost of living, or some combination of these 
measures relative to a baseline year.”203  Under this provision, altering or 
exceeding the limits would require a legislative super majority, rather than 
approval by voters.204  This provision would also provide voters with the de-
sired limitations on state government spending without the stringent re-
strictions of the Hancock Amendment that have caused problems for gov-
ernment services such as the problems faced by MSD in the Zweig decision. 
The third option would be to keep Section 16 of the Hancock Amend-
ment but place within it some caveats, or “escape” provisions.  While voter 
approval could still be sought for new or increased taxes, those taxes that 
were unsuccessful at the ballot box could ultimately be levied after approval 
by a super majority of both houses of the legislature and the governor’s signa-
ture.  People unhappy with new or increased taxes which they voted against 
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and which were later levied due to this proposed caveat could voice their 
disapproval in the next election.  This option would give voters a say, but 
would also allow the legislature the opportunity to determine if some revenue 
must be raised regardless of voters’ opinions.  Once the taxes have been lev-
ied, voters could then evaluate the actual effects and determine if the result of 
the government’s “override” of their vote was wise and whether it returned a 
favorable result.  If not, voters could voice their opposition once more simply 
by voting to “throw the bums out” 205 at the next election. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Zweig highlighted several 
problems and unintended consequences of the current Hancock Amendment.  
The solutions proposed in this Note could solve these problems while simul-
taneously satisfying Missouri citizens with restrictions on government reve-
nues and spending.  These proposals are a good starting point in the conversa-
tion about whether the Hancock Amendment should be kept as is, amended, 
or repealed. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Nobody likes paying taxes, but is the Hancock Amendment the right 
way to limit state revenue and spending?  Lawmakers continuously find ways 
around its requirements.  Litigation involving the Hancock Amendment then 
ensues, taking up large amounts of the court system’s time and resources and 
costing the government, and in turn the taxpayers, millions of dollars.206  Ad-
ditionally, the revenue limit causes a noticeable decline in the quality of ser-
vices that the government provides.  Although a complete overhaul of the 
Hancock Amendment may not be necessary, these implications, some 
brought to the forefront by Zweig v. Metropolitan St Louis Sewer District, 
weigh in favor of lawmakers and legal scholars taking a second look at the 
Hancock Amendment.  With all of the negative implications of the Hancock 
Amendment in practice, there must be a better way. 
 
 205. This was a common phrase used by Carl H. Esbeck, former R.B. Price Pro-
fessor Emeritus of Law and former Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor Emeritus 
of Law at the University of Missouri School of Law; J.D. with distinction 1974, Cor-
nell University.  Professor Esbeck often used this phrase in Constitutional Law to 
illustrate the most basic, and sometimes only, remedy that citizens have to redress an 
actual or perceived government abuse of power. 
 206. See, e.g., Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 249-52 
(Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
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